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Conflicts between the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court and the Legislature: Campaign Finance Reform and 
Same-Sex Marriage 
MARK C. MILLER∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article will examine recent interactions and dialogues between the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (“SJC” or “Supreme Judicial 
Court”) and the Massachusetts State Legislature.  The interactions between 
courts and legislatures are often cordial, but sometimes these interactions 
are also highly conflictual.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the relationship 
between the Massachusetts legislature and the Supreme Court was indeed 
mainly cooperative.1  Recently, however, in several high profile cases the 
Supreme Court has been willing to challenge directly the decisions of the 
legislature and vice versa.  Among other controversies, the Court’s 2002 
decision requiring that the state legislature fund the campaign finance re-
form initiative known in Massachusetts as the Clean Elections law,2 and 
the Court’s 2003 decision that same-sex couples could not be denied mar-
riage licenses under the state constitution,3 have created a great deal of 
friction between the Supreme Court and the legislature.  This article will 
examine these controversies in some detail in order to gain a better under-
standing of the different institutional perspectives and different institu-
tional wills that drive the relationship between these two institutions of 
government.  My conclusion is that there needs to be greater communica-
tion between the legislative and judicial branches, and that each institution 
needs to have greater respect for the other body. 
  
 ∗  Mark C. Miller, J.D., Ph.D.  Professor Miller is the Chair of the Department of Government and 
Director of the Law & Society Program at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. 
 1. See generally Mark C. Miller, A Legislative Perspective on the Ohio, Massachusetts, and Fed-
eral Courts, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 235 (1995) [hereinafter Miller, Legislative Perspective]; Mark C. Miller. 
Lawmaker Attitudes Toward Court Reform in Massachusetts, 77 Judicature 34 (1993) [hereinafter 
Lawmaker Attitudes]. 
 2. Bates v. Dir. of the Off. of Campaign and Political Fin., 763 N.E.2d 6 (Mass. 2002). 
 3. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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II. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE SUPREME COURTS AND STATE 
LEGISLATURES GENERALLY 
State courts are certainly important decision-makers in the American 
system of government.  Of course, Justice Brennan reminded us of the im-
portance of the state courts in a famous speech before the New Jersey Bar 
Association in 1976 entitled, “Guardians of Our Liberties – State Courts 
No Less than Federal.”4  And as Hall has argued, “Overcoming ignorance 
of the politics of state courts is necessary for a complete understanding of 
American politics and the vital role played by judicial institutions in the 
political process. . . .  State courts can no longer be dismissed as inconse-
quential.”5  Brace and Hall also argue that state courts are important insti-
tutions in our system of government.  These scholars note that:  
Throughout United States history, state courts have played a fun-
damental role in keeping a lid on majoritarian impulses.  They 
have tinkered with the particulars of majoritarian outcomes by re-
solving disputes and restricting alternatives.  State courts have 
done this commonly in obscurity but with the confidence of the 
American people.6  
State supreme courts, however, cannot and should not be studied in a 
vacuum without paying careful attention to the courts’ interactions with 
other institutions of government.  As Porter and Tarr argue, “[T]o under-
stand how state supreme courts participate in governance, one must also 
look at them as institutions of state government, interacting with and both 
influencing and being influenced by other political actors in the state.”7  
Agreeing that state supreme courts cannot be considered in isolation, Laura 
Langer notes that, “The system of checks and balances ties political ambi-
tions pursued by judges to the ambitions of the other government actors.  
While each branch of government works against the other, they must also 
work together.”8 Scholars and practitioners alike are therefore abandoning 
the simplistic high school civics textbook understanding of the separation 
of powers concept for a more realistic and nuanced version that can be 
  
 4. David M. O’Brien, Judges on Judging: Views from the Bench 279-286 (2d ed., CQ Press 2004).  
 5. Melinda Gann Hall, State Judicial Politics: Rules, Structures, and the Political Game, in Ameri-
can State and Local Politics 138 (Ronald E. Weber & Paul Brace eds., Chatham H. Publishers 1999). 
 6. Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Is Judicial Federalism Essential to Democracy? State 
Courts in the Federal System in The Judicial Branch 183 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 
Oxford U. Press 2005). 
 7. State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 41 (Mary C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., Yale U. Press 
1988).   
 8. Laura Langer, Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative Study 12 (State U. N.Y. 
Press 2002). 
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called governance as dialogue.9  Instead of examining each branch of gov-
ernment separately, new institutionalist scholars are thus beginning to take 
a closer look at the interactions among the institutions of government in 
order to understand better the role of each body.10  As Richard Neustadt 
reminds us, in the United States, we do not have separate and distinct 
branches of government, but instead we have separated governmental insti-
tutions sharing powers.11  
These separated institutions must interact in a variety of ways over a 
range of issues at both the state and federal levels, therefore creating a sys-
tem of governance as dialogue among the different branches of govern-
ment at each level.  The interactions between the federal courts and other 
branches have begun to receive some scholarly notice lately,12 but the in-
teractions and dialogues between state supreme courts and state legisla-
tures have not yet received the attention that they clearly deserve.  As 
Glick notes:  
Clearly, state supreme courts are important political institutions 
within their own political systems, and combined, they contribute 
importantly to public policy nationwide. . . .  But research also 
needs to link state supreme courts to the policymaking and politi-
cal roles of other state political institutions.13   
Langer goes even further when she argues, “Fundamentally, judges do not 
operate in a vacuum.  Rather state supreme court justices are expected to 
alter their votes in response to the anticipated reactions from the legislature 
and the governor.”14 
  
 9. See e.g. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues (Princeton U. Press 1988); Judges and Legisla-
tors: Toward Institutional Comity (Robert A. Katzmann ed., The Brookings Instn. 1988) [hereinafter 
Judges and Legislators]. 
 10. See e.g. Making Policy, Making Law: An Interbranch Perspective (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes 
eds., Georgetown U. Press 2004) [hereinafter Making Policy]. 
 11. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership 
from Roosevelt to Reagan 34 (Free Press 1990). 
 12. See e.g. Jeb Barnes, Overruled? Legislative Overrides, Pluralism, and Court-Congress Rela-
tions in an Age of Statutes (Stanford U. Press 2004) [hereinafter Overruled]; Congress and The Consti-
tution (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., Duke U. Press 2005); Robert A. Katzmann, Courts 
and Congress (Brookings Inst. Press 1997) [hereinafter Courts and Congress]; Lauren C. Bell & Kevin 
M. Scott, Policy Statements or Symbolic Politics? Explaining Congressional Court-limiting Attempts, 
89 Judicature 196 (2006); Beth Henschen, Congressional Response to the Statutory Interpretations of 
the Supreme Court, 11 Am. Pol. Q. 441 (1983); Mark C. Miller, Congressional Committees and the 
Federal Courts: A Neo-Institutional Perspective, 45 W. Political Q. 949 (1992). 
 13. Henry R. Glick, Policy Making and State Supreme Courts in The American Courts: A Critical 
Assessment 115 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., CQ Press 1991). 
 14. Langer, supra n. 8, at 16. 
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This article is clearly rooted in the new institutionalist analysis.15 Al-
though there are now at least three different approaches that come under 
the new institutionalist umbrella [rational-choice, sociological, and histori-
cal-interpretive institutionalisms],16 it is now generally agreed that the new 
institutionalist or neo-institutionalist analysis examines how institutional 
features constrict the actions of individual political actors.17 As Smith ar-
gues, a neo-institutionalist analysis focuses on the “interrelationship be-
tween human ‘institutions’ or ‘structures’ and the decisions and actions of 
political actors.”18 Thus, the new institutionalist approach attempts to com-
bine the traditionalist scholar’s interest in understanding governmental 
bodies as institutions with the behavioralist’s emphasis on empirical, indi-
vidual-level research.19  This article will draw mostly from the historical-
interpretative strain of neo-institutionalism, although it will also borrow 
some ideas such as institutional cultures from the sociological branch of 
new institutionalist analysis. 
A very important aspect of the new institutionalist approach is the at-
tempt to understand the so-called institutional will of the organization.20 
Governmental institutions are more than just mere automatically function-
ing organizations or systems, in large part because of the importance that 
ideas play in molding their institutional perspectives and institutional cul-
tures.  Smith explains that institutions “have a kind of life of their own.  
They influence the self-conception of those who occupy roles defined by 
them in ways that can give those persons distinctly ‘institutional perspec-
tives.’”21 Or as Rawls conceptionalizes institutions, they are “an abstract 
object” realized in “thought or conduct.”22  The institutional will of an in-
stitution then results from a combination of the collective perspectives of 
  
 15. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of 
Politics (Free Press 1989); James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organiza-
tional Factors in Political Life, 78 Am. Political Sci. Rev. 734 (1984). 
 16. See Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 1-12 (Cornell W. Clay-
ton & Howard Gillman eds., U. of Chi. Press 1999) [hereinafter Clayton & Gillman]; Peter A. Hall, & 
Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 94 Political Stud. 936 
(1996). 
 17. See e.g. Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Insti-
tutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making in Clayton & Gillman, supra n. 16, at 
67. 
 18. Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the “New Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public 
Law, 82 Am. Political Sci. Rev. 89, 91 (1988). 
 19. See e.g. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Disputes: A Neo-
Institutional Perspective, 33 Am. J. of Political Sci. 825 (1989). 
 20. See e.g. Lawrence C. Dodd, Congress, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Legitimation in Con-
gress Reconsidered, (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 2d ed., Cong. Q. Press 1981); 
Mark C. Miller, The View of the Courts from the Hill: A Neoinstitutional Approach in Making Policy, 
supra n. 10, at 55. 
 21. Smith, supra n. 18, at 95. 
 22. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 55 (Harvard U. Press 1971). 
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the individuals who make up the institution and the institutional culture of 
the organization.  Clearly in the last few years the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court and the state legislature have developed radically different 
institutional perspectives and clearly conflicting institutional wills. 
The literature on the relationship between the courts and Congress is 
clearly helpful in attempting to understand the interactions between the 
state courts and the state legislatures. Although he was focusing on the 
relationship among the institutions at the federal level, the comments of 
Michael H. Armacost, former president of the Brookings Institution, pre-
sent an equally important point about the relationships between state courts 
and state legislatures.  Armacost has written, “[t]he judiciary seeks an envi-
ronment respectful of its independence.  Congress seeks a judicial system 
that faithfully construes the laws of the legislative branch and efficiently 
discharges justice.”23 Thus the two institutions often just do not understand 
how and why the other makes decisions.  As Davidson and Oleszek com-
ment about the federal level inter-branch relationships, “Communications 
between Congress and the federal courts are less than perfect.  Neither 
branch understands the workings of the other very well.”24  This lack of 
communication between the branches also exists at the state level and is 
clearly a problem for our political system.  The political scientist, Judge 
Robert A. Katzmann, reminds us, “Governance . . . is premised on each 
institution’s respect for and knowledge of the others and on a continuing 
dialogue that produces shared understanding and comity.”25   
Even though legislatures and courts have different institutional per-
spectives and different institutional wills, it is nonetheless important to 
note that most of the interactions between legislatures and courts are rou-
tine in nature and perhaps even mundane.  Resnick reminds us that usually 
these interactions are also cooperative and non-conflictual.26  These routine 
interactions between the branches do not make the news or usually even 
get the attention of scholars.  As J. Mitchell Pickerill argues about the fed-
eral level:  
Those who [always] expect a constitutional revolution, a constitu-
tional moment, or other form of severe confrontation between the 
Court and Congress simply do not appreciate the more routine and 
  
 23. Courts and Congress, supra n. 12, at vii. 
 24. Roger H. Davidson & Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and its Members 321 (6th ed., Cong. Q. 
Press 1998). 
 25. Courts and Congress, supra n. 12, at 1. 
 26. See Judith Resnik et al., The Independence of the Federal Judiciary, 17 Bull. of the Am. Acad. 
of Arts and Sci. 17 (2004); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the 
Meaning of Article III., 113 Harv. L. Rev. 924 (2000). 
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typical type of interaction between Court and Congress in the po-
litical process.27  
And as Lovell writes, “[T]he appearance of conflict between independent 
branches frequently masks more cooperative interaction between interde-
pendent branches.”28  
These differences in institutional constraints between legislative bodies 
and the courts are nicely illustrated by the question of whether a single 
individual would make different choices on the same issue depending on 
whether they were a legislator or whether they were a judge.  In other 
words, would the different institutional cultures, different institutional 
needs, and different institutional wills of the courts and Congress compel 
different results from the same individual depending upon which institu-
tion they were serving and what role they were playing?  Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor addressed just this question in her dissent in a case where 
the majority ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional for juveniles 
who committed the crime in question before they were eighteen years 
old,29 where she wrote, “[w]ere my office that of a legislator, rather than a 
judge, then I, too, would be inclined to support legislation setting a mini-
mum age of eighteen in this context.”30  
Therefore, sometimes judges wish that they could act like legislators 
but feel that their reading of the law requires a different result.  For exam-
ple, in Texas v. Johnson,31 the case that declared that burning the American 
flag is protected political speech under the First Amendment, Justice Ken-
nedy in his concurring opinion wrote about judges in general:  
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not 
like.  We make them because they are right, right in the sense that 
the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.  
And so great is our commitment to the process that, except in the 
rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the result, per-
haps for fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the 
decision.32 
Justice John Paul Stevens of the United States Supreme Court has also 
said that his decisions on a variety of issues would be different if he were 
  
 27. J. Mitchell Pickerill, Constitutional Deliberation In Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in 
a Separated System 130 (Duke U. Press 2004). 
 28. George I. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals: Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American 
Democracy xix-xx (Cambridge U. Press 2003). 
 29. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 607. 
 31. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 32. Id. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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in Congress rather than having to make the decisions from the bench.  For 
example, in 2005 the United States Supreme Court handed down two 
highly controversial decisions. The first said that local governments can 
use their power of eminent domain to “take” private property in order to 
facilitate private economic development.33  The second ruled that the Con-
gress can decide to use federal drug laws to overrule various state decisions 
that had allowed marijuana use for medical purposes.34  From a policy 
point of view, Justice Stevens said in a public speech to a bar association 
meeting in Las Vegas that both outcomes were “unwise,” but were re-
quired by his reading of the Constitution.  Clearly illustrating the differ-
ences between decisions made by members of Congress and those made by 
judges, Justice Stevens concluded that, “in each [decision he] was con-
vinced that the law compelled a result that [he] would have opposed if [he] 
were a legislator.”35  Thus in areas where law and politics collide, judges 
tend to make decisions based on their reading of the law while legislators 
tend to make their decisions based purely on political considerations.   
This article is also grounded in the governance as dialogue school of 
thought that says that the United States Supreme Court, and by analogy the 
state supreme courts, do not necessarily have the final say on issues of con-
stitutionality.36  Instead, William Eskridge37 and others argue that one 
could think of the relationship among the courts, the legislature, and the 
executive as a multi-player game where no institution has the “last word,” 
but that issues of constitutionality play themselves out in a continuous col-
loquy or dialogue.  Most of this literature focuses on the interactions be-
tween Congress and the federal courts, but the analysis can be equally 
valid at the state level.  As Louis Fisher has argued, “An open dialogue 
between Congress and the courts is a more fruitful avenue for constitu-
tional interpretation than simply believing that the judiciary possesses su-
perior skills and authority.”38  In a different work, Fisher also stated his 
belief that, “Although the Supreme Court periodically announces that it has 
the ‘final word’ on constitutional law, the reality has always been quite 
different.”39  Fisher argues that scholars should explore not only how the 
  
 33. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 34. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 35. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. Times A1 (Aug. 25, 
2005). 
 36. See e.g. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch of Government: The Supreme Court 
at the Bar of Politics 240 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962). 
 37. See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil 
Rights Game, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 613 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding]. 
 38. Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law 1051 (6th ed., Carolina Academic Press 2005). 
 39. Louis Fisher, Judicial Finality or an Ongoing Colloquy? in Making Policy, supra n. 10, at 153. 
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courts interact with Congress, but also with the President, executive branch 
agencies, the states, interest groups, the legal academic community, and the 
public at large.40   
III. THE MASSACHUSETTS CASE STUDY 
Thus, the relationship between the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court and the state legislature provides an interesting case study of the 
broader question of how state courts and legislative bodies interact.  At this 
point a brief description of these two governmental institutions would be 
useful.  The Massachusetts Legislature, known formally as the Massachu-
setts General Court, consists of the 160 member House of Representatives 
and the forty-member Senate.  It has long been considered one of the most 
professionalized state legislatures in the country, based in part on length of 
legislative sessions, frequency of turnover, legislator salaries, and staff-
ing.41  The state legislature also has a very high percentage of self-
identified full-time legislators.42 The Speaker of the House and the Presi-
dent of the Senate tend to be very powerful forces in their respective 
chambers, although the Senate has traditionally been more egalitarian than 
the House.43  Both houses of the legislature have been totally dominated by 
Democrats for several decades, although the last four governors in the 
State have been Republicans. 
In Massachusetts, all judges on all three levels of courts in the State, 
including the Supreme Judicial Court's justices, are appointed by the Gov-
ernor for life terms until the mandatory retirement age of seventy.  “Al-
though not constitutionally required, since 1991 [all the governors] by ex-
ecutive order ha[ve] used so-called merit selection nominating commis-
sions to help select candidates for the state bench.”44  The Governor’s judi-
cial choices are then confirmed by the State’s little known and even less 
understood elected body called the Governor’s Council.  Created in colo-
nial times as the people’s envoy to the royal governor, today the obscure 
Governor’s Council has few formal duties beyond confirming the Gover-
nor’s judicial and quasi-judicial appointments (such as coroners, notaries 
public, justices of the peace, etc.) and approving gubernatorial pardons.  
The Governor’s Council consists of eight members elected from special 
  
 40. Fisher, supra n. 38, at 22. 
 41. Malcom E. Jewell, Representation in State Legislatures 7 (U. Press of Ky. 1982). 
 42. Miller, Lawmaker Attitudes, supra n. 1, at 37. 
 43. See Frank Phillips, Finneran’s Focus Doubted Amid Redistricting Probe, Boston Globe B1 
(Apr. 19, 2004). 
 44. Miller, Legislative Perspective, supra n. 1, at 242 n. 30. 
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districts for two-year terms, plus the Lieutenant Governor.  Many in the 
State have called for the abolition of the Governor’s Council,45 and, as will 
be discussed in more detail below, in March 2004 the state legislature con-
sidered, but did not approve a constitutional amendment to give the legisla-
ture confirmation power for judicial appointments.  The state legislature 
currently plays no formal role in the judicial selection process in Massa-
chusetts and has little informal influence over the selection decisions.  The 
entire judicial selection process usually receives very little attention in the 
legislature or in the state’s media.46  
Traditionally, the Supreme Judicial Court has been a highly respected 
judicial body.  On a variety of reputational indexes, it has scored quite 
well.  For example, in 1920 the Court ranked first in the nation among state 
supreme courts while in 1975 it ranked fifth.  In the same study, forty-
seven states reported citing Court’s precedent.47 As the former chair of the 
Massachusetts Legislature’s Joint Committee on the Judiciary, Democratic 
Representative Eugene O’Flaherty noted on March 30, 2004, during a con-
stitutional convention considering an amendment to change the judicial 
selection process in the State:  
Having been chair of the Judiciary [Committee], I have had an in-
credible opportunity to talk to members of the judiciary from other 
states and it has impressed me how they view our judiciary as 
some of the finest legal scholars in the nation.48  
Of the seven members of the Court sitting in 2004, six of them were ap-
pointed by Republican Governors.  
At times in its history, the Court has taken very progressive stands that 
drew nation-wide attention.  For example, in 1783 the Court was the first 
state supreme court to outlaw slavery (as the current Chief Justice Marga-
ret Marshall is fond of reminding listeners in her public speeches),49 and in 
1984 the Court decided that the death penalty violated the state constitu-
tion.50  But the Court’s decisions on campaign finance reform and same-
sex marriage have drawn the most attention recently.  These decisions 
  
 45. See e.g. Robert L. Turner, Editorial: A Council Whose Time has Passed, Boston Globe 19 (Feb. 
27, 1992). 
 46. Miller, Lawmaker Attitudes, supra n. 1.   
 47. Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 Political Behavior 83, 89, 92 
(1983). 
 48. All quotations from the debates held during the state constitutional conventions come from the 
transcriptions of the debates made by the State House News service, a private reporting organization.  
The transcriptions can be found at State House News Service, http://www.statehousenews.com (ac-
cessed May 22, 2006). 
 49. Melanie Mangum, Clark Grads Hear SJC’s Marshall, Worcester Telegram & Gaz. A1 (May 24, 
2004). 
 50. Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984). 
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among others have created a great deal of mistrust among the three 
branches of government in Massachusetts. 
A popular new strain of judicial scholarship sees the courts as strategic 
decision-makers.51 Most of these works draw heavily from Walter Mur-
phy’s insights.52  While most of the literature centers on the strategic deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, recently more works have begun 
to examine the strategic behavior of state supreme courts as well.53  Al-
though much of this literature focuses on statutory interpretation cases, 
Epstein, Knight, and Martin argue that judges also act strategically when 
writing constitutionally based decisions.54  These scholars assert that 
judges have policy and ideological preferences, but also that judges act 
strategically in order to reach those goals in both statutory interpretation 
and in constitutionally based decisions.  Therefore judges cannot, “simply 
vote their own ideological preferences as if they are operating in a vacuum; 
they must instead be attentive to the preferences of the other institutions 
and the actions they expect them to take if they want to generate enduring 
policy.”55  Thus, judges are seen as wanting to make good decisions in the 
cases before them, but also as ideological and strategic political actors who 
anticipate the reactions of other institutions to their judicial decisions.  As 
Hall and Brace explain this approach:  
[J]udges’ goals are pursued strategically in response to context and 
to institutional arrangements that link the two. . . . Generally, one 
might expect the nature of a court’s or a judge’s response to con-
text to depend, in part, upon institutional features that create, to 
greater or lesser degrees, linkages to the political environment.56 
Therefore, one can assume that state supreme courts are acting strategically 
and asserting their institutional wills when they hand down highly contro-
versial constitutional decisions that appear to challenge legislative majori-
  
 51. See e.g. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make  (CQ Press 1998); Forrest 
Maltzman et al., Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (Cambridge U. Press 2000); 
Eskridge, Overriding, supra n. 37; John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, The Limitation of Statutes: Stra-
tegic Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo. L.J. 565 (1992). 
 52. Walter Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (U. Chi. Press 1964). 
 53. See e.g. Scott A. Comparato, Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts 
(Praeger Publishers 2003); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, State Supreme Courts and Their Envi-
ronments: Avenues to General Theories of Judicial Choice in Clayton & Gillman, supra n. 16, at 281; 
Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. Pol. 427 
(1992). 
 54. Lee Epstein et al., Constitutional Interpretation from a Strategic Perspective in Making Policy, 
supra n. 10. 
 55. Id. at 173. 
 56. Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace, State Supreme Courts and Their Environments: Avenues to 
General Theories of Judicial Choice, in Clayton & Gillman, supra n. 16, at 285. 
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ties.  The nature of these controversial decisions may change according to 
the political environment present and other contextual factors.   
The strategic model of judicial decision-making assumes that, when 
making controversial decisions, judges consider many more factors than 
just the legal facts of the cases before them, including how the other 
branches of government will react to their pronouncements.  It seems logi-
cal that, before handing down highly controversial constitutionally based 
decisions, state supreme courts clearly anticipate the reactions of legisla-
tive bodies.  While most of the academic work on interbranch interactions 
has focused on the relationship between Congress and the United States 
Supreme Court,57 the lessons learned seem equally valid when examining 
the relationship between state supreme courts and state legislatures.  Dis-
cussing the court-legislative relationship at the federal level, Baum and 
Hausegger argue, “In fact, the conception that justices routinely take Con-
gress into account in reaching decisions has become the predominant way 
of thinking about how the Court responds to congressional power.”58  It 
seems quite reasonable to assume that state supreme courts approach their 
relationship to their state legislatures in much the same way, especially in a 
state like Massachusetts where the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court 
have life terms similar to those of their federal counterparts. 
A. Campaign Finance Reform 
In Massachusetts, it appears that the Supreme Judicial Court was react-
ing to a changing political environment when the Court issued several con-
stitutional decisions to which the state legislature strongly objected.  The 
recent feud between the courts and the legislature in Massachusetts first 
erupted when the Court in January 2002 declared that the legislature was 
constitutionally required to fund the State’s Clean Elections law or repeal it 
altogether.59 This case was extremely important in developing the latest 
versions of the institutional wills and perspectives of these two organiza-
tions.  As one journalist noted at the time:  
  
 57. See e.g. Overruled, supra n. 12; Congress Confronts the Court: The Struggle for Legitimacy and 
Authority in Lawmaking (Colton C. Campbell & John F. Stack, Jr. eds., Rowman & Littlefield 2001); 
Courts and Congress, supra n. 12; Judges and Legislators, supra n. 9; Lovell, supra n. 28; Pickerill, 
supra n. 27; John R. Schmidhauser & Larry L. Berg, The Supreme Court and Congress: Conflict and 
Interaction, 1945-1968 (Free Press 1972). 
 58. Lawrence Baum & Lori Hausegger, The Supreme Court and Congress: Reconsidering the Rela-
tionship in Making Policy, supra n. 10, at 109. 
 59. See Pam Belluck, Act on Clean Elections Law, Court Orders Massachusetts, N.Y. Times 16 
(Jan. 29, 2002).  
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The case has been closely watched not only because of its implica-
tions for candidates and their campaigns, but also because it forced 
the high court, which has traditionally resisted involving itself in 
legislative affairs, to grapple with whether to preserve a law widely 
despised by incumbent legislators.60  
This conflict signaled a clear shift in the political environment in the 
State, including the relationship between the state Supreme Court and the 
legislature.  As Massachusetts Appeals Court Judge Gordon Doerfer ex-
plained the judiciary’s different institutional perspective and institutional 
culture in the State:  
[T]here’s a great deal of historical tension, at least in Massachu-
setts, and a great deal of misunderstanding between the legislative 
and the judicial branches.  The legislative branch is suspicious of 
what the judges do; the judges are suspicious of what the legisla-
tors do.  A lot of it is just a lack of sunshine, a lack of contact, and 
a lack of an attempt to have a normal dialogue.61  
The story about this new period of conflict between the Court and the 
legislature begins when the voters in November 1998 approved by a 
twelve-to-one margin a referendum to create one of the strongest campaign 
finance reform laws in the country.62  Only four states had enacted such 
campaign finance reform programs at the time.  The new Massachusetts 
program would have provided public funding to any candidates for any 
state office, including the legislature, who agreed to specific limits on how 
much they would raise and how much they would spend for the election.  
As one journalist noted, “[t]he program’s advocates said that the plan 
would lessen the influence of special interest groups, enable more people 
to run for office and make races more competitive.”63   
Due in part to the fierce opposition of Speaker Thomas M. Finneran 
and other key legislators, the legislature refused to fund the Clean Elec-
tions program even though it was approved by the voters by such a wide 
margin.  In 2000, the legislature did authorize $23 million for the program, 
but then refused over a period of several years to appropriate any money 
that Clean Elections candidates could actually tap.64 Several candidates 
running for office in 2002 sued, and the Supreme Judicial Court in January 
  
 60. Rick Klein, Fund or Repeal Clean Elections, Justices Order, Boston Globe B4 (Jan. 26, 2002). 
 61. Gordon Doerfer, The Courts, the Legislature, and the Executive: Separate and Equal?, 87 Judi-
cature 230, 236 (2004). 
 62. Brian Faler, Mass. Clean Elections May be Doomed, Wash. Post A6 (June 8, 2003). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Seth Stern, Bay State Politics Roiled by Funding of Clean Elections, Christian Sci. Monitor 2 
(May 6, 2002). 
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2002 ruled that the legislature either had to repeal the law or fully fund it.  
An editorial in the Boston Globe called the Court’s Clean Elections deci-
sion, “A Victory for Democracy” and the Globe’s editorial staff com-
mented: “The court’s 5-2 order made it clear that the Legislature, while an 
independent and co-equal branch of government, cannot flout the state 
Constitution.”65 The fight between the legislature and the Court was just 
beginning.  As one journalist exclaimed, “The Supreme Judicial Court has 
gotten into the business of doing the unthinkable on Beacon Hill: bossing 
around House Speaker Thomas M. Finneran.”66  
Clearly thumbing its nose at the Court’s ruling, the legislature again re-
fused to fund the law, so the Court then ruled that the State could be forced 
to sell surplus state property in order to fund the Clean Elections program.  
Advocates of the Clean Elections law even attempted to sell the office fur-
niture of Speaker Finneran and of Representative Joseph Wagner, the chair 
of the Elections Committee in the legislature.67  They also tried to get the 
Court to sell the legislators’ parking spaces.68  Instead of giving in to the 
supporters of the law, Representative Wagner moved all of his office furni-
ture into storage, and Speaker Finneran sued to keep his office furniture 
intact.  The Court agreed to allow the Speaker to continue furnishing his 
office, calling the request to sell his furniture “an unseemly media cir-
cus.”69  But the conflict revealed the clear differences in the institutional 
wills of the two bodies.  As one journalist noted, “Showdowns between 
branches of government over how best to spend money aren’t unusual. . . .  
But seldom does a legislature so brazenly ignore a court mandate.”70  Pre-
dicting further problems, because of the Court’s decision, another journal-
ist noted, “It’s uncharted territory for a court that tries to hover above poli-
tics, and if the state’s highest court takes on the state’s most powerful and 
controversial political figure, it could have lasting consequences for the 
judicial branch.”71 
After the Court forced the sale of some state cars and a vacant state 
owned hospital, the legislature quite reluctantly agreed to appropriate $4 
million for the Clean Elections law for the 2002 election cycle.  Twelve 
clean elections candidates used the public money in the November 2002 
  
 65. A Victory for Democracy, Boston Globe A14 (Jan. 26, 2002). 
 66. Rick Klein, Risks Lurk in SJC’s Clash with Legislature, Boston Globe B1 (Mar. 11, 2002). 
 67. Elisabeth J. Beardsley, Election Fund Backers put Price on Finneran’s Desk, Boston Herald 1 
(Apr. 10, 2002). 
 68. Stern, supra n. 64. 
 69. Massachusetts Legislature Repeals Clean Elections Law, N.Y. Times A16 (June 21, 2003) 
(quotations omitted) [hereinafter Clean Elections].  
 70. Stern, supra n. 64. 
 71. Klein, supra n. 66. 
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elections, but they were outspent by a margin of twenty-three-to-one.72  
The legislature also placed a non-binding question on the November 2002 
ballot written in such a way that the voters would reject the Clean Elec-
tions concept.  Supporters of the Clean Elections law placed a second ques-
tion on the ballot, written in such a way to garner support for the program.  
Predictably, the voters split on the questions.  Eventually, in June 2003, the 
legislature included an amendment in the annual budget bill to repeal the 
Clean Elections law.  The amendment was adopted on a voice vote with 
very little discussion.73  Governor Romney never supported the law and 
refused to veto its repeal.  Thus, the law died a relatively quiet death after a 
long and tortuous struggle between the legislature and the Court over its 
funding.74  
However, the legislative responses to the Court’s rulings on the Clean 
Elections issue were far from quiet.  In a speech to the Boston Bar Asso-
ciation, soon after the Supreme Judicial Court’s initial Clean Elections 
decision, Speaker Finneran commented, “I think it is well beyond contro-
versial for courts to begin to dictate the results or the outcomes of the 
budget process.”75  Soon after that speech, Speaker Finneran increased his 
attacks on the Court and called for the direct election of all judges in the 
State, which would have ended the life appointments that have allowed 
Massachusetts judges to retain their judicial independence.76  Cleary angry 
about what he saw as the Court’s intrusion into legislative turf, Speaker 
Finneran said of the Court’s decision: “Some kind of cleansing agent may 
have to be brought to bear.  We give independence to the judiciary.  But if 
the court’s going to insert itself into things like this, you may as well put 
everything on the ballot.”77 Ironically, of course, the Clean Elections law 
had been initiated by the voters.   
Conservative columnist Jeff Jacoby is among many who want more 
accountability for the judges in Massachusetts.  Jacoby has argued:  
In a democracy, the people are supposed to be supreme, but Mas-
sachusetts law gives the people no recourse when a judge has lost 
their trust and respect.  That is not healthy.  Judges are not meant 
to be gods on high, secure in their power whether or not they have 
  
 72. Clean Elections, supra n. 69. 
 73. Faler, supra n. 62. 
 74. Clean Elections, supra n. 69. 
 75. David Abel, Finneran Questions SJC Ruling, Boston Globe B1 (Jan. 27, 2002). 
 76. Klein, supra n. 66. 
 77. Rick Klein, Finneran Suggests Election of Judges, Boston Globe A1 (Feb. 8, 2002). 
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the consent of the governed.  They are public servants, and should 
be answerable to their masters.78  
Other members of the legislature suggested the less radical idea of 
switching to a retention election system for judges.79  The Speaker’s threats 
to switch to the election of judges never led to any legislative action, but he 
clearly brought up the idea in retaliation for the Court’s Clean Elections 
decision.  A somewhat similar proposal to elect the State’s judges, how-
ever, was eventually considered by a March 2004 constitutional conven-
tion, but the proposal was quickly modified to provide for legislative con-
firmation of judicial appointees instead.  That amended proposal was then 
referred to committee for further study without being approved.   
While the legislature has not dramatically altered the selection system 
for judges in Massachusetts, it has recently used its budget powers to at-
tempt to exert more direct control over the courts.  Legislators have suc-
cessfully pressured individual judges to hire their political supporters and 
friends because the “Massachusetts’ budgeting system, in which the Legis-
lature controls individual budget line items for the State’s sixty-one court-
houses, allows lawmakers to punish some judges and reward others with 
funding.”80 The legislature has also used its budget powers in other ways.  
For example, after the Court’s Clean Elections decision, the legislature 
took away the ability of judges to hire their own probation officers, giving 
that power to the State’s Commissioner of Probation, a key ally of Speaker 
Finneran.81  
Also following the Court’s Clean Elections ruling, key members of the 
legislature recommended that all hiring and firing responsibilities for judi-
cial staff be transferred from the judges to the clerk magistrates, who are 
closely tied politically to the leaders of the legislature.  Under the proposal, 
the clerk magistrates would have been able to oversee all court personnel 
except judges, control the assignment of judges, and veto the granting of 
leaves of absence to judges.82  That measure would have even prevented 
judges from hiring their own secretaries and clerks.83  The legal establish-
ment in the State quickly condemned the idea, although most judges re-
mained painfully silent.84  Edward P. Ryan, Jr., the then immediate past 
president of the Massachusetts Bar Association, said of the proposal: “In 
  
 78. Jeff Jacoby, Who Should Judge the Bay State’s Judges?, Boston Globe E7 (May 12, 2002). 
 79. Frank Phillips, Judges Watch as Legislators Ready a Power Play, Boston Globe B1 (May 7, 
2002). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Jacoby, supra n. 78. 
 82. Phillips, supra n. 79. 
 83. Jacoby, supra n. 78. 
 84. Phillips, supra n. 79. 
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my [twenty-six] years, I have never seen relations between the Legislature 
and the courts at this level.  I think we are at a very serious moment in the 
history of the Commonwealth.”85  Michael B. Keating, then president of 
the Boston Bar Association, complained:  
I am disturbed by the level of rhetoric involving the court system.  
The level reflected in this amendment could undermine the author-
ity of the courts, which are so integral to our society.86 
Another potentially fierce conflict was averted when the legislature even-
tually backed down and instead created a new commission to study judicial 
operations.87   
The conflicts between the courts and the legislature continued to sim-
mer for the next several years.  In addition to repealing the Clean Elections 
law, in the June 2003 budget bill the legislature also expanded the Boston 
Municipal Court to include eight previously independent district courts.  
Governor Romney had called for the abolition of the Boston Municipal 
Court, but the legislature expanded its jurisdiction instead.  The Boston 
Globe declared in an editorial that, “the Legislature was mean-spirited to 
use the [Boston Municipal Court] BMC issue to reaffirm its archaic domi-
nation of the courts.”88  Jacoby summarized the fights between the courts 
and the legislature in Massachusetts when he concluded:  
Judges in Massachusetts have long been under the Legislature’s 
thumb; if [Speaker] Finneran gets his way, they will find them-
selves under its heel.  At that point, two of the state’s three 
branches of government will be controlled by a small clique of 
Democratic politicians, and the transformation of Massachusetts 
from democracy to oligarchy will be nearly complete.89  
B. Same-Sex Marriage  
Even more serious tensions between the legislature and the courts 
erupted when the Supreme Judicial Court in November 2003 declared that 
denying marriage rights to same-sex couples violated the state constitution.  
A variety of same-sex couples had attempted to obtain marriage licenses in 
Massachusetts.  When their applications were denied, they filed a lawsuit 
in the state courts arguing that the state constitution prohibited discrimina-
  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Jennifer Peter, Gay Marriage Decision Renews Tension between Legislature, Courts, Associated 
Press (Nov. 28, 2003). 
 88. Stealth Lawmaking, Boston Globe A18 (June 25, 2003). 
 89. Jacoby, supra n. 78. 
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tion against same-sex couples and therefore required that they be allowed 
to marry.  The lawsuit followed similar judicial rulings in Hawaii,90 
Alaska,91 Vermont,92 and Ontario.93  Although the highest courts in Hawaii 
and Alaska ruled that same-sex marriages could not be prohibited under 
their state constitutions, those state constitutions were later amended to 
prevent same-sex couples from marrying.94  The Supreme Court of Ver-
mont ruled that same-sex couples deserved equal rights under its state con-
stitution, but allowed the legislature to fashion a remedy to protect those 
rights.  The legislature chose a new option, and thus civil unions for same-
sex couples were born in Vermont.95  The highest court in Ontario, in the 
spring 2003, declared that same-sex couples had an immediate right to 
marry in that province.96  This was the context that faced the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court when it ruled on the same-sex marriage issue. 
In November 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, cit-
ing the Ontario decision, ruled that the Massachusetts constitution prohib-
ited discrimination against same-sex couples and therefore declared that 
marriage licenses could not be denied to same-sex couples in the state.  
The Court’s opinion gave the legislature six months before same-sex mar-
riages would become legalized to allow the legislature to adjust any stat-
utes, rules, etc. as necessary.  The 4-3 opinion created a great deal of con-
troversy nationwide.  In response, President George W. Bush advocated a 
federal constitutional amendment to overturn the Court’s ruling.97  In all 
the media hype over the Court’s ruling, rarely was it mentioned that six of 
the seven justices on the Court were Republican appointees.  
In response to the Court’s decision declaring a right to same-sex mar-
riage in the state, the state Senate in January 2004 requested an advisory 
opinion from the Court asking whether Vermont-style civil unions would 
meet the Court’s requirements.  On February 5, 2004, the Court responded 
  
 90. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  For more detailed discussions of the Hawaii ruling, 
see Patricia A. Cain, Rainbow Rights: The Role of Lawyers and Courts in the Lesbian and Gay Civil 
Rights Movement 259-61 (Westview Press 2000) and Jason Pierceson, Courts, Liberalism, and Rights: 
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 91. The Alaska case was decided by a trial court in the state.  See Liz Rushkin, Judge Backs Gay 
Marriage; Superior Court Ruling Puts Burden on State to Justify Ban, Anchorage Daily News A-1 
(Feb. 29, 1998).  For more detailed discussions of the Alaska ruling, see Pierceson, supra n. 90, at 125-
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 92. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).   
 93. Halpern v. Atty. Gen. of Can., 172 O.A.C. 276 (2003). 
 94. See Michael Mello, Legalizing Gay Marriage 12 (Temple U. Press 2004). 
 95. For more detailed discussions of the Vermont ruling, see Pierceson, supra n. 90, at 130-43, Cain, 
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with the same 4-3 majority stating that civil unions would not be suffi-
cient.98  The Court’s majority stated:  
This is not a matter of social policy but of constitutional interpreta-
tion.  As the  court concluded in Goodridge, the traditional, historic 
nature and meaning of civil  marriage in Massachusetts is as a 
wholly secular and dynamic legal institution, the governmental 
aim of which is to encourage stable adult relationships for the 
 good of the individual and of the community, especially its chil-
dren.  The very nature and purpose of civil marriage, the court con-
cluded, renders unconstitutional any attempt to ban all same-sex 
couples, as same-sex couples,  from entering into civil marriage. . 
. .  The dissimilitude between the terms ‘civil  marriage’ and ‘civil 
unions’ is not innocuous; it is a considered choice of  language 
that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homo-
sexual  couples, to second-class status. . . .  The history of our na-
tion has demonstrated  that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.99   
Following the Massachusetts decisions on same-sex marriage, same-
sex marriage laws spread to many other countries; however, as of March 
2006 no other state court in the United States has followed the lead of the 
Supreme Judicial Court.  In Canada, the highest courts in eight provinces 
and one territory quickly agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeals that 
same-sex marriages were constitutionally required,100 and the Supreme 
Court of Canada issued a unanimous ruling in December 2004 paving the 
way for federal legislation to make same-sex marriages legal, although it 
stopped just short of requiring them.101  Legislation making same-sex mar-
riage legal throughout Canada passed the parliament in July 2004,102 al-
though the election of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 
January 2006 cast some doubt on the issue.103  In late 2005, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa also declared that same-sex marriage is a 
  
 98. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004). 
 99. Id. at 569. 
 100. Re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698; see also Doug Struck, Same-Sex Marriage Ad-
vances in Canada, Wash. Post A01 (June 29, 2005). 
 101. See Clifford Krauss, Canada’s Supreme Court Clears Way for Same-Sex Marriage Law, N.Y. 
Times A7 (Dec. 10, 2004); Doug Struck, High Court in Canada Backs Gay Marriage, Wash. Post A01 
(Dec. 10, 2004). 
 102. See Struck, supra n. 101; Senate OKs Same-Sex Bill, Ottawa Sun 14 (July 20, 2005). 
 103. See Stephanie Rubec, Same-Sex Vote Soon, Ottawa Sun 6 (Jan. 27, 2006). 
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right in that country,104 thus joining Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain as sanctioning same-sex marriages.105  
Some jurisdictions established legalized same-sex partnerships or civil 
unions using legislation instead of court orders.  Following the Supreme 
Judicial Court’s decision, the State of Connecticut established same-sex 
civil unions through legislation.106  The Spanish parliament also enacted 
legislation legalizing same-sex marriage,107 and in late 2005 same-sex civil 
partnerships became legal in the United Kingdom through legislative 
means (although the press throughout the United Kingdom repeatedly re-
ferred to these events as same-sex marriages and same-sex weddings).108  
In September 2004, the California legislature voted narrowly to approve a 
bill legalizing same-sex marriage, but that legislation was vetoed by Gov-
ernor Arnold Schwarzenegger.109 
The Supreme Judicial Court’s second ruling on same-sex marriage 
again ignited a firestorm of controversy in the legislature, increasing calls 
for a state constitutional amendment to overturn the court’s decisions.110  In 
Massachusetts, a joint session of the legislature, sitting in a constitutional 
convention, must first approve an amendment to the state constitution by a 
majority vote.  Then a second constitutional convention, held after legisla-
tive elections have occurred, must also approve the amendment.  After that, 
the amendment must be approved by a majority of the voters in the State 
on the general election ballot.  Thus, the earliest that the Court’s opinion 
on same-sex marriages could have been overturned by a state constitutional 
amendment would have been November 2004.   
However, the constitutional amendment proposal approved by the leg-
islature in March 2004 by a vote of 105-92 was defeated in the legislature 
in September 2004, with only thirty-nine members voting in favor of it and 
one hundred and fifty-seven opposed to the amendment.111  A second way 
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for constitutional amendments to appear on the ballot for voter considera-
tion is for supporters to collect over 65,000 signatures from voters in the 
State.  A proposed constitutional amendment proposed by initiative re-
quires only fifty votes in two successive sessions of the legislature.112  Af-
ter the defeat of the anti same-sex marriage constitutional amendment in 
the legislature in 2005, opponents of same-sex marriage then turned to 
getting an initiative drive to get a constitutional amendment proposal be-
fore the voters, but such a proposal could appear on the ballot no earlier 
than November 2008.113 
The situation concerning the debate over same-sex marriage in 2004 il-
lustrates the clear conflicts between the institutional will of the legislature 
and the courts in Massachusetts.  The powerful then Speaker of the House, 
conservative Democrat Thomas M. Finneran, had long been an opponent 
of gay rights.  Before the Court’s decision on same-sex marriage, he had 
blocked House consideration of popular legislation to create civil unions or 
even domestic partnerships for gay couples.  During the constitutional 
convention, however, the Speaker and the then President of the Senate 
supported a so-called compromise version of an amendment that would 
have barred same-sex marriage but would have created civil unions in the 
State.  The Speaker’s position was that the Court was improperly activist in 
its decision, and that the legislature had to take steps to overturn that deci-
sion through a constitutional amendment process like those enacted after 
similar court decisions in Hawaii and in Alaska.  During the February 11, 
2004 debates on the constitutional amendment, the Speaker said:  
In at least two other jurisdictions, Alaska and Hawaii, where there 
was  imposition by the judiciary, the people reacted to that [by 
amending their state  constitutions].  [The courts’ actions were] 
seen as highly inappropriate. . . .  This  amendment, if adopted, 
would begin the course of correction of the SJC’s  intrusion into 
an area where they are not to operate, the area of policy. That is 
[the  legislature’s] jurisdiction and domain. That is the reason you 
ran for office, to  shape and speak out and fight for public policy. 
It is emphatically not the domain of the SJC.114  
  
 112. See Raphael Lewis, Reilly OK’s 2008 Initiative on Ban of Gay Marriage, Boston Globe A1 
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Proving how different the institutional perspectives of the court and the 
legislature were on this issue, the Speaker went on to further attack the 
Court’s majority opinion when he said: 
That 4-3 decision has caused extraordinary division and contro-
versy.  Everybody I have spoken to has commented on the vitu-
perative language of the decision.  I have read and re-read the deci-
sion.  In the majority opinion was a statement that I would describe 
as libelous and defamatory of this institution.  The libel spoke to 
the definition of marriage that has come to us from custom, tradi-
tion, every society, every culture, and every nation in all of re-
corded history as one man and one woman.  The defamatory 
statement stated this: in light of that extraordinary history, the SJC 
said this about you and the citizens of Massachusetts.  They said 
that definition was rooted in animus and bigotry.115 
After same-sex marriage became legal in the state on May 17, 2004, 
Speaker Finneran’s first cousin was one of the first people to apply for a 
marriage license.  The Speaker was not invited to the wedding.  When 
asked about his cousin’s wedding, Finneran replied:  
I’m a traditionalist.  My sense is this would have been better left to 
the consideration of the Legislature rather than to an edict of the 
judiciary.  It’s a classic separation of powers [question] in my 
mind, and I don’t think any amount of conversation with any fam-
ily members would have changed my position.116 
Finneran may have also been less active on this issue because at the 
time he was facing a federal investigation about whether he committed 
perjury during a federal trial concerning state redistricting efforts in 2001.  
A three judge panel of the Massachusetts District Court ruled in 2004 that 
the state legislative redistricting plan was racially discriminatory, and they 
strongly suggested that Finneran had lied during the trial when he stated 
that he was not involved in the redistricting efforts and that he did not 
know the racial makeup of his own House district.117  Amid this federal 
investigation, Speaker Finneran resigned in September 2004 to become a 
lobbyist for the State’s biotech industry. 
  
 115. The compromise constitutional amendment eventually passed the constitutional convention in 
March 2004 by a slim margin, but it died when the legislature voted on it again in September 2005.  
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Statements made during the constitutional conventions by other legis-
lators who opposed the Court’s decision also reveal the radically different 
institutional wills between the legislature and the Court on the issue of 
same-sex marriage.  For example, Senate Minority Leader Brian Lees 
stated on February 11, 2004, “[t]he SJC usurped the people’s power.”  Re-
publican Representative Paul Loscocco said on the same day:  
Shame on the SJC.  Four activist judges made the decision.  Re-
gardless of the position on gay marriage, there should be outrage 
over their specious legal reasoning.  They stifled debate by the 
people and the legislators.  That's contrary to our representative 
form of government.  If left unchecked, what rights will the court 
attempt to usurp tomorrow? 
In a similar vein, Democratic Representative Marie Parente noted, “The 
[Massachusetts] constitution is the oldest in the world and says the judici-
ary must never interfere in the business of the Legislature.  Four people are 
going to change what the people of the Commonwealth want and eventu-
ally impact the entire country.” In addition, Democratic Representative 
Stephen Tobin stated on March 11, 2004, “Three thousand years of re-
corded history have upheld the definition of marriage.  It is presumptuous 
for a court to challenge that and hold that they are more enlightened.” 118 
Some legislators cited the dissents in the Goodridge same-sex marriage 
case to bolster their arguments that the Court’s majority acted improperly.  
The dissents in the Clean Elections case had also stated that the Court 
should stay out of legislative affairs.  On March 11, 2004, Republican Rep-
resentative John Lepper noted: 
Read the SJC dissents.  Judge Spina wrote that the power of the 
Legislature to affect social change without interference from the 
courts is at risk.  Judge Sosman said the people should decide 
when the benefits of marriage should be extended, whatever the 
risk.  She said it was not up to the court to decide when the time is 
right. Judge Cordy said the Legislature is the appropriate branch to 
answer this question.119 
Other legislators argued that the Supreme Judicial Court should have 
left the final decision to the people instead of interpreting the state consti-
tution in an activist manner.  Democratic Representative John Rogers ar-
gued:  
  
 118. See supra n. 48. 
 119. Id. 
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The 4 to 3 Goodridge decision to many citizens transformed us 
from a government of and for the people to a government of four 
people. The only forum for us to debate is this one.  The great 
question before this body is whether the people have a right to par-
ticipate in that debate or whether we shall allow the Goodridge de-
cision to stand?  The courts cannot change the constitution; they 
can interpret it.  The executive branch cannot change the constitu-
tion; they enforce it.  The legislative branch can make recommen-
dations, but cannot change the  constitution.  The only ones who 
can change the constitution are the people themselves.  On this 
question, should they be allowed to?120 
On the other hand, former Republican Governor William Weld, two 
former Democratic state attorneys general, the president of the Boston Bar 
Association, and well-known constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe of 
Harvard Law School all supported the Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion.121  
The executive director of the Log Cabin Republicans in the State, former 
state representative Patrick Guerriero, called the Court’s decision bold and 
historic.  He also said of the Court’s decision:  
More significantly, the power and clarity of the decision stems 
from the fundamentally conservative and family-values based ar-
guments offered by the state’s highest court. . . .  The opponents of 
basic fairness for all Massachusetts families are left arguing 
against stable relationships, against increased protection for all 
children, against limited government, against individual liberty, 
and against religious freedom.122   
The Massachusetts Bar Association also supports the same-sex marriage 
ruling, as does a special panel of the New York State Bar Association who 
forwarded a proposal yet to be acted on by the full state bar association.123  
Many Massachusetts legislators also supported the Court’s handling of 
this sensitive issue.  They often argued that it was the Court’s duty and 
responsibility to interpret the state constitution in order to protect minority 
interests and to prevent discrimination.  Speaking during the February 11, 
2004 constitutional convention, Democratic Representative Frank Smizik 
said of the Court:  
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My political and formative years took place during the civil rights 
struggles of the [19]60s.  The judges in the heart of the south were 
at risk of impeachment, danger to life and limb and of being ostra-
cized. Still they upheld the equal protection law of the constitution. 
. . .  The [SJC] exercised its judgment as the court is required to 
do.  If we push with one of these amendments today, we will be 
trying to usurp the court's decision.  I can't go that route. Courts 
have a long history of providing civil rights to our citizens.  I ap-
preciate the special role decisions have made regarding constitu-
tional rights. 
Keeping with the theme that the Court was merely preventing discrimina-
tion, Democratic Representative Ruth Balser argued:  
Why are so many people trying to write discrimination into our 
Constitution?  Although I am saddened, I am not surprised.  When 
women and blacks and Irish Americans and workers fought for 
their rights, many fought them back.  It does not surprise me that 
when homosexual people fight for their rights, many heterosexual 
people fight back.  The SJC has done us proud.  My constituents 
support the decision.124 
On February 12, 2004, Representative Byron Rushing, an African-
American Democrat, noted that the Court’s decision was based only on the 
requirements of the Massachusetts Constitution and not on the provisions 
of the United States Constitution.  Representative Rushing stated:  
The United States Constitution and the Constitution of Massachu-
setts in 1790 were very different documents because the United 
States Constitution did not guarantee liberty. But the Massachu-
setts Constitution did. . . .  One judge ruled that slavery was un-
constitutional in Massachusetts.  Not because of the United States 
Constitution, but because of the Massachusetts Constitution. . . .  
We were able to take this remarkable position because of a consti-
tution that said liberty would be available to every citizen of this 
commonwealth.  We are being called by some today to change 
that. We are being asked to say to one group – you no longer have 
the rights of everyone else in this Commonwealth.  
Arguing that the legislature should preserve the special judicial role in the 
State, during the March 11, 2004 constitutional convention Democratic 
Representative Jay Kaufman argued that, “[t]he courts serve as a check on 
  
 124. See supra n. 48. 
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legislative action or legislative inaction. The plaintiffs took their case to the 
SJC because we the Legislature failed them. They did what any citizen has 
the right to do. They went to the courts.”125 
Some legislators argued that the institutional wills of the legislature 
and the courts should work together to end discrimination in the State.  For 
example, then House Majority Leader Salvatore DiMasi (who later became 
Speaker of the House in October 2004) gave this impassioned explanation 
on March 11, 2004 for his opposition to the constitutional amendment sup-
ported by the Speaker of the House: 
My grandfather read the Bible and constitution by the window. I 
had to ask why he read the constitution.  He said it gave hope and 
promise to him and his family because it gave rights and privileges 
to everyone.  He marveled at how each person, even he as an im-
migrant, would be free to live the life he desired equally.  I stand to 
protect and defend the constitution my grandfather held so dear 
and taught me to respect.  It is the oldest continuous constitution in 
the world. It is a living and breathing and evolving document.  Its 
contents reference equality, justice, the enjoyment of life and lib-
erty.  Our commitment binds us to ensure the constitution contains 
the highest and noblest of ideals.  It must not be a weapon to ren-
der any citizen less than any of our fellow citizens.  The SJC has 
found the constitution does not discriminate amongst its citizens.  
Today we gather to possibly change that, to consider language so 
divisive and damaging that we must ask ourselves whether we em-
brace two classes of citizens?  I hope it is not.  When legislators 
have been slow to act, the public has no recourse other than the 
courts. 
Also supporting the Court’s judicial perspective on this case, the Assistant 
Majority Leader in the Senate, Democratic Senator Marian Walsh, noted 
her opposition to the constitutional amendment being supported by the 
Senate President and by the Speaker when she stated on March 29, 2004, 
“The SJC did not amend our Constitution, they interpreted it.  That is their 
function.  They did not hijack democracy.  They did not diminish this Leg-
islature. They did not dismiss my constituents.  They heard a case before 
them and they applied the law.”  Also supporting the interpretive role of 
the courts, Republican Senator JoAnn Sprague concluded that: 
I believe the SJC was rendering an impartial interpretation of our 
constitution. The framers of the constitution envisioned a constitu-
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tion of civil government, not sectarian or theological government. 
That guarantees that all of us have equal access to civil procedures 
under a civil government. We are here to decide whether to change 
our great constitution. Some say the Legislature needs to speak be-
cause the SJC has overstepped its judicial boundaries. I suggest 
that our SJC did exactly what our framers of our constitution or-
dered them to do when asked to make a judgment. They provided 
an impartial interpretation of Massachusetts law. 
Other legislators linked the controversies over the Supreme Judicial Court 
decision in the Clean Elections case and its decision on same-sex marriage.  
For example, Democratic Representative Christopher Fallon concluded:  
I feel frustrated by some of my colleagues who have criticized the 
SJC.  Yes, it was a narrow vote.  So are we going to start picking 
and choosing what judicial rulings we are going to uphold?  That's 
an affront to the Constitution. I find it hypocritical that some mem-
bers are also arguing to put this before the voters after [the legisla-
ture] gutted Clean Elections.126 
From the Governor’s office, Republican Governor Mitt Romney tried 
to do everything within his limited powers to block implementation of the 
state Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage, but for the 
most part he was unsuccessful in his efforts.  Romney had repeatedly said 
that the voters, and not the courts, should define marriage in the State.127  
He tried to ask the Court to stay their decision, pending the outcome of the 
legislature’s vote on a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage.  
However, the Democratic State Attorney General Thomas Reilly refused to 
allow the Governor to present his request to the Court, stating that only the 
Attorney General’s office could request such a stay.128  The Attorney Gen-
eral, a likely Democratic candidate for the governor’s office in the next 
election, then refused to do so.  The Governor then asked the legislature for 
the authority to bypass the Attorney General’s office on the issue and per-
sonally present his request to the Court, but it also refused.129  In the first 
few days after same-sex marriage became legal in Massachusetts, unclear 
about the political ramifications of his opposition to same-sex marriage, 
the Governor then opted to stay out of the limelight.130   
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The Governor within a few days, however, became more active in the 
fight against allowing same-sex marriage to spread to other states.  Some 
critics of the Governor said that he was using this issue to bolster his na-
tion-wide image, regardless of what his opposition did to his standing 
within the State.131  When the Governor declared that a 1913 law discussed 
in more detail below prohibited out-of-state gay couples from obtaining 
marriage licenses, several town clerks said that they would openly defy his 
directives.  The Governor then asked the Attorney General to investigate 
whether the clerks were in violation of the state law.  Eventually, with the 
Attorney General’s help,132 the Governor forced the clerks to abide by his 
wishes, but the town clerks later filed a lawsuit claiming that the 1913 law 
was unconstitutionally discriminatory.133  Using a rational basis test, in 
March 2005 the Court ruled that the 1913 law was not unconstitutional.134 
Governor Romney then declared his support for a federal constitutional 
amendment to overturn the Court’s decision, in addition to the state consti-
tutional amendment that he also then supported.135  The outcome of the 
Governor’s actions was that his approval ratings dropped in the State,136 
although he did get some positive attention from conservative voices out-
side Massachusetts.137  But liberals inside Massachusetts were furious with 
the Governor.  For example, when the Governor gave the commencement 
address at Suffolk University in Boston in May 2004, many students and 
faculty stood and turned their backs during the Governor’s address in pro-
test against his staunch opposition to same-sex marriage.138   
Other opponents of gay marriage have also tried a variety of tactics to 
attempt to overturn the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision legalizing same-
sex marriage.  For example, several legislators introduced long-shot bills to 
remove from the bench the four justices who voted in favor of allowing 
same-sex marriage. The last time the state legislature actually removed a 
justice from the Supreme Judicial Court was in 1803, and the only other 
attempt ended in failure in 1922.139  In addition, thirteen legislators filed a 
suit in state courts to block implementation of the Court’s decision, arguing 
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that the Court had no jurisdiction over marriage issues.  One lobbyist who 
supports same-sex marriage said that the Supreme Judicial Court was fully 
within its authority to issue its ruling in the Goodridge case, and ridiculed 
the legislators’ lawsuit by stating, “[n]ow they’re throwing something the 
equivalent of a legislative temper tantrum as a result.”140  The Supreme 
Judicial Court eventually rejected the suit.141   
Opponents also filed suit in federal court in an attempt to block the 
granting of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  The plaintiffs included 
eleven members of the state legislature.  They argued that the Supreme 
Judicial Court overstepped its authority by revising the definition of mar-
riage, an action that the plaintiffs argued is solely a legislative function in 
the State.  They also urged the court to stop same-sex marriages until the 
voters could vote on the constitutional amendment to outlaw gay marriage 
and create civil unions instead that passed the legislature in March 2004.  
Their case was rejected by the Massachusetts District Court in May 2004.  
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit did hear 
oral arguments on the case in early June 2004, but the three-judge panel 
ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and the court refused to stop 
the legalization of same-sex marriages.142 Representative Travis, the lead 
author of the proposed state constitutional amendment to ban gay mar-
riages, argued that the Supreme Judicial Court had usurped his power as a 
state lawmaker when it declared that denying marriage rights to same-sex 
couples is discriminatory under the state constitution.  Revealing that he 
had a very different understanding of the role of the judiciary and of the 
legislature, Representative Travis argued, “We never gave them the author-
ity to redefine marriage.”143  The United States Supreme Court eventually 
refused to grant certiorari in the case, thus allowing same-sex marriages to 
continue in the state.144  
The issue of whether out-of-state same-sex couples could marry in 
Massachusetts was complicated by a 1913 state law that forbids a marriage 
within the State if that marriage would be void in the couple’s home state.  
Many argued that the law was enacted in part to prevent out-of-state inter-
racial couples from marrying in Massachusetts.145  The law had not been 
enforced in the State for decades, but after same-sex marriages became 
legal in Massachusetts in May 2004, Republican Governor Romney and 
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the Democratic State Attorney General Reilly interpreted the law to ban 
the marriages of gay couples who did not intend to reside in the State.  
Several towns and cities in the State such as Somerville, Provincetown, 
Springfield, and Worcester initially attempted to defy the Governor’s in-
structions to refuse to issue marriage licenses to out-of-state couples, but 
eventually they acceded to the orders from the Governor and the state At-
torney General to stop issuing such licenses.  The orders were preceded by 
demands from the Governor that the towns submit copies of the marriage 
licenses from out of state couples to his office, and he forwarded those 
applications to the state Attorney General.146  Several elected local district 
attorneys said that they would not prosecute town clerks who issued mar-
riage licenses to out-of-state couples, and they questioned the Governor’s 
interpretation of the previously unenforced law.147  The Republican Gover-
nor, however, then refused to allow state officials to record officially the 
marriage applications from out-of-state couples who did not say that they 
intended to reside in Massachusetts, and the State Attorney General even-
tually ordered towns to stop accepting marriage license applications from 
out-of-state couples.148  
Two separate lawsuits challenged the constitutionality of the enforce-
ment of the 1913 law, one filed by twelve Massachusetts cities and towns 
which argued in part that the town clerks should not be forced to be the 
“marriage police,” and a second suit filed by a variety of same-sex couples 
who attempted to marry in Massachusetts and were turned away or who 
were actually married but their marriages were later invalidated by the 
State.149  Both lawsuits argued that the 1913 law was unconstitutionally 
discriminatory, given the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision allowing 
same-sex marriages as a matter of right under the state constitution.  Some 
of the couples lived in states such as Maine or New Hampshire with so-
called Defense of Marriage Acts that outlaw same-sex marriage, while 
other couples lived in states where the validity of same-sex marriages per-
formed in Massachusetts was less clear.150  A state trial judge refused to 
block enforcement of the controversial state law because the State started 
applying it to both gay and straight marriages, although the judge did state 
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that the law violated the spirit of the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision.151  
Supporters of same-sex marriage appealed that decision as part of their 
larger litigation strategy.152  The Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argu-
ments in this case in October 2005,153 and on March 30, 2006  ruled that 
the 1913 law was not unconstitutional, using a rational basis test.154 
In response to a demand from the Governor of Massachusetts asking 
whether same-sex marriages performed in Massachusetts would be valid in 
their states, the attorney generals of New York, Rhode Island, and Con-
necticut responded that the issue was not settled in their states; this opened 
the door for additional lawsuits to clarify the situation in those states with-
out a Defense of Marriage Act or a state constitutional prohibition on 
same-sex marriage.155  In the Massachusetts legislature, during delibera-
tions on the annual budget bill in May 2004, the state Senate overwhelm-
ingly voted to repeal the 1913 law.156  Five Senate Republicans even voted 
to repeal the law, and some legislators interpreted the overwhelming repeal 
vote as a clear rebuke to the Governor.157  However, the final compromise 
version of the budget bill omitted the repeal language.158  Given the 
Court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the 1913 law, opponents 
of the measure are again calling for the legislature to repeal the statute.159  
After same-sex marriages became legal in Massachusetts on May 17, 
2004, over 2,500 gay couples sought marriage licenses in the first week 
alone following that date.160  As of November 2004, over 4,200 same-sex 
couples had been married in Massachusetts.161  Most public opinion polls 
showed opposition to same-sex marriage dropping in the State after the 
marriages became legal.162  In the November 2004 legislative elections, 
supporters of same-sex marriage actually gained seats in the state legisla-
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ture.163  Supporters of same-sex marriage were also bolstered with the res-
ignation of the anti-gay rights Speaker Finneran in September 2004 and his 
replacement by liberal Democrat Speaker Salvatore DiMasi, a supporter of 
same-sex marriage.164 Supporters of same-sex marriage also wondered 
whether Senate President Robert Travaglini, a supporter of the compromise 
constitutional amendment outlawing same-sex marriage but allowing civil 
unions, had changed his position on the issue when he delivered a strongly 
supportive toast at the same-sex wedding of state Senator Jarrett T. Barrios 
after the November 2004 legislative elections.165  
The September 2005 defeat of the constitutional amendment to reverse 
the Court’s decision revealed that opponents of same-sex marriage will 
have a very difficult time in Massachusetts.  Between the March 2004 vote 
and the September 2005 vote, fifty-five of the lawmakers (over twenty-five 
percent of the legislators) switched their votes on the amendment, leaving 
the proposed amendment with only thirty-nine supporters in the legisla-
ture.166  After the defeat of the anti same-sex marriage constitutional 
amendment in the legislature in 2005, opponents of same-sex marriage 
then turned to getting an initiative drive to get a constitutional amendment 
proposal before the voters, but such a proposal could appear on the ballot 
no earlier than November 2008.167  A proposed constitutional amendment 
proposed by initiative requires only fifty votes in two successive sessions 
of the legislature.  Two key proponents of reversing the Court’s decision 
on same-sex marriage have either changed their views or have left the leg-
islature.  In November 2005, state Representative Eugene L. O’Flaherty 
announced that he would no longer support a constitutional amendment to 
prohibit same-sex marriage.168  State Representative Philip Travis, whom 
the Boston Globe declared to be “the preeminent gay marriage opponent in 
the Legislature,” announced that he was not seeking reelection in 2006.169 
C. Judicial Elections 
The conflicts between the legislature and the courts have manifested 
themselves in other ways as well.  In part as a reaction to the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court’s ruling in the same-sex marriage case, and in part because the 
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state courts were perceived to be too lenient on criminal sentencing mat-
ters, Republican Senator Michael Knapik authored a proposed constitu-
tional amendment in 2003 that would have changed the judicial selection 
system in the State to provide for the direct partisan election of all state 
judges for six-year terms.  Senator Knapik argued that his proposed 
amendment was necessary because:  
This amendment would allow for the periodic reaffirmation of 
judges. . . .  A judge's name would go before voters every six years 
in their jurisdiction.  Their record would be made available.  It was 
designed to create a greater degree of accountability.  We all have 
to face voters every two years and defend our records.  We too of-
ten cannot ask judges how they come to their conclusions. In some 
situations it just defies logic.   
The constitutional convention considered the proposed amendment on 
March 30, 2004.  However, on the motion of Democratic Senator Robert 
Creedon, then chair of the Joint Committee on the Judiciary, the proposed 
amendment was modified to delete the language providing for the election 
of judges and instead to allow for legislative confirmation of judicial ap-
pointments.  The constitutional amendment, as modified, was then for-
warded to the Judiciary Committee for further study.170   
It is unclear whether this amendment will ever be considered again in 
the future.  Both Governor Romney and Chief Justice Margaret Marshall of 
the Supreme Judicial Court have both publicly stated that they strongly 
oppose the election of judges in the State.171  However, Lieutenant Gover-
nor Kerry Healey, who is running for Governor in 2006, has called for a 
constitutional amendment to limit state judges to seven year renewable 
terms.172 
IV. OBSERVATIONS DERIVED FROM THE MASSACHUSETTS CASE STUDY 
The issues of campaign finance reform and same-sex marriage clearly 
illustrate the different institutional perspectives and institutional wills of 
the Court and the legislature in Massachusetts.  Until 2002, it appeared that 
the Court did not have the will to challenge the legislature directly.  It had 
avoided clear conflicts with the legislative branch for decades.  After 2002, 
  
 170. See supra n. 48. 
 171. Raphael Lewis & Jonathan Saltzman, SJC Chief Justice Counters “Judicial Activism” Charge, 
Boston Globe A1 (Oct. 20, 2004). 
 172. See Edward P. Leibersperger, Protecting Judicial Independence, Boston Globe A13 (Apr. 4, 
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however, the Court’s institutional will obviously changed, in part because 
the political environment and other contextual factors had changed.  The 
majority of the justices on the Court then saw their role as doing justice by 
interpreting and applying the state constitution regardless of how the legis-
lature and its powerful Speaker felt about the issue.  The Court and the rest 
of the state court system went from being perceived as being subservient to 
the legislature to asserting their independence and their own views on sev-
eral critical policy issues.  One must assume that the justices of the Court 
were acting strategically and asserting their institutional will when they 
handed down this series of constitutional decisions that resulted in their 
dramatically changed relationship with the state legislature. 
Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall, the author of the Court opinions 
on same-sex marriage, remained unapologetic about the court’s actions.  In 
a highly publicized speech to the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce 
delivered just before the November 2004 elections, Chief Justice Marshall 
refuted what she called “attack politics” that sometimes ensnare judges and 
endangers an independent judiciary.  When asked to defend her colleagues, 
the Chief Justice stated, “I don’t think they are activist judges.  I think they 
are judges doing their constitutional duty.”173  The Chief Justice continued:  
Judges do become the focus of attack politics.  It has been so since 
our country’s founding and is certainly evident in the heated politi-
cal climate today. . . .  It  would be foolish, in my judgment, to 
heed the voices of those who would curtail a judge’s independ-
ence. . . .  It would be foolish to tinker with the [John] Adams 
model of constitutional government that has served us so well for 
more than two centuries.174   
The Chief Justice concluded by telling the business leaders present that, 
“an independent judiciary, sustained by public trust and commitment, is 
good for business.”175  Some scholars such as Cass Sunstein assumed at the 
time that Chief Justice Marshall’s comments were a thinly veiled criticism 
of conservative efforts in Congress to prevent federal judges from declar-
ing the so-called federal Defense of Marriage Act to be unconstitutional.176  
Chief Justice Marshall has also expressed her concern that judicial salaries 
in the State are too low, and that the legislature seems to be delaying any 
pay raises for judges perhaps because of its concern over a variety of Su-
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 176. See id.   
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preme Judicial Court decisions.177  But clearly the Chief Justice was assert-
ing her institution’s perspective that an independent judiciary will not al-
ways hand down the decisions that elected politicians prefer.  The Chief 
Justice was clearly implying that the Court would continue asserting its 
own institutional will against whatever forces would seek to challenge that 
will.178 
Thus the relationship between the Supreme Judicial Court and the leg-
islature in Massachusetts over the last few years has generally been tense 
and conflictual.  Although the legislature has refused to grant salary in-
creases to judges for several years and it has used its appropriations power 
to control patronage hiring in individual courthouses,179 the state legislature 
has nevertheless refused to take more drastic measures to attack the courts 
as institutions such as changing the selection system for state judges or 
impeaching judges for their views.180  To date, the legislature has also 
failed to pass constitutional amendments to overturn the highly controver-
sial Court decisions discussed in this article.   
Why has the Supreme Judicial Court been protected from the harshest 
of the possible attacks from the state legislature?  One explanation is that 
the judicial branch is protected by a notion of reverence for the courts 
among the voters and therefore among their elected officials.  This rever-
ence for the courts explanation was quite popular among academics in the 
1960’s, and Murphy and Pritchett in 1961 framed the argument in this way, 
“courts are protected by their magic; only rarely can a hand be laid on a 
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judge without a public outcry of sacrilege.”181  In the late 1960’s, Stuart 
Nagel argued that milder attacks on specific court decisions were very dif-
ferent and more common than full scale attacks on the courts.182  Harry 
Stumpf also agreed with the reverence for the courts argument when he 
wrote, “The prestige or sacrosanctity argument in Congress is used and 
used with some effectiveness in protecting the judiciary against anti-Court 
legislative reaction.”183  By the 1970’s, many scholars were questioning the 
validity of the reverence for the courts hypothesis.184  Given the different 
institutional perspectives and institutional wills among the legislature and 
Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts, it does not seem that the courts 
are protected by their “magic” in the Commonwealth. 
There are also some other interesting arguments for why the Massa-
chusetts legislature did not make serious and substantial attacks on the 
courts as an institution in the recent period where the relationship between 
the two institutions of government was tense at best.  One argument is that 
because there are so many lawyers serving in the Massachusetts legislature 
the courts are protected from the most egregious legislative attacks.  Law-
yer-legislators have more respect for the courts than do their non-lawyer 
colleagues, and thus would move to prevent frontal attacks on the judici-
ary.185  A different argument regards the interplay between the state judi-
cial selection method and the policymaking role of the courts.  Laura 
Langer and Teena Wilhelm argue that retaliation by the state legislature 
against the courts varies by the type of judicial selection system used in the 
state.  These scholars based their findings on extensive interviews with 
state Supreme Court justices and with legislators in a variety of states using 
the entire range of state judicial selection methods.  Langer and Wilhelm 
found that states with executive appointment of judges (like Massachu-
setts) and states with life tenure for their state judges (like Massachusetts) 
have some of the lowest levels of direct institutional attacks and retaliation 
against the courts.186   
Another explanation is that even when activist courts are striking down 
legislation, they are not really acting in a counter-majoritarian fashion.  
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Neal Devins argues that even when declaring legislation to be unconstitu-
tional, the United States. Supreme Court and by analogy state supreme 
courts take their cues “from elected officials, the public, or elites (academ-
ics, journalists, and other opinion leaders).”187  In other words, even activ-
ist courts may be following the majority will, or at least following elite 
opinion on the issue.  Thus when the Court handed down its decisions on 
campaign finance reform, it was merely reflecting the views of the vast 
majority of the voters who had approved the State’s campaign finance re-
form program.  Likewise, when the Court declared that there was a right to 
same-sex marriage under the state constitution, it seems to have been re-
flecting majority will in the State.  Since the supporters of same-sex mar-
riage gained seats in the legislature in the election following the court’s 
decision, and since some of the staunchest legislative opponents of same-
sex marriage have either changed their positions or retired from the legisla-
ture in dismay, there seems to be a great deal of support for this argument.  
Changes in the leadership of the legislature may have also contributed to 
the fact that the legislature did not have the institutional will to overturn 
the Court’s same-sex marriage decisions or the desire to punish the court 
for those decisions.  Whether the Court was leading or following public 
opinion or even elite opinion in the state on the same-sex marriage issue is 
an open question, but it seems that the court was not offering a classic 
counter-majoritarian attack on the legislature in the controversy.  Now the 
Court seems right in tune with both public opinion and elite opinion in the 
State on the question.  
In his recent book on the relationship between the federal courts and 
Congress,188 Charles Gardner Geyh offers a different explanation for the 
fact that the federal legislature has not to date enacted direct institutional 
attacks on the judiciary such as impeaching federal judges for their un-
popular decisions.  After dismissing arguments that the courts are protected 
from attack due to the constitutional notion of separation of powers or be-
cause of legislative neglect or indifference, Geyh posits that the courts are 
protected instead by a notion of “customary independence.”  This concept 
seems equally applicable to the state supreme courts.  He defines this con-
cept as:  
[T]he emergence and entrenchment of customs, conventions, or 
norms that have guided Congress in its regulation of the federal 
judiciary.  These customs, conventions, or norms have created for 
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the judiciary a zone of autonomy that Congress respects in the ex-
ercise of its constitutional powers over courts and judges.189   
Geyh continues with his explanation, “Over the course of our history, 
Congress has slowly come to accept the role of an independent judiciary in 
American government.  In that time, it experimented with a variety of 
means to control court decision making, eventually jettisoning them an 
antithetical to judicial independence.”190  He concludes that this notion of 
“customary independence” has created a “dynamic equilibrium” in the 
relationship between the legislative and judicial branches. 191  Because of 
this “dynamic equilibrium” which favors the “customary independence” of 
the courts, the legislature has refrained from enacting serious attacks on the 
courts.  Thus President Roosevelt’s infamous Court-Packing Plan failed in 
Congress,192 and no judge has been impeached at the federal level for their 
judicial views since Justice Samuel Chase of the United States Supreme 
Court in 1803.193  Geyh warns, however, that customary independence 
might not protect the courts forever.  He concludes, “It would be a mistake 
to assume that independence norms have been so deeply entrenched as to 
render either these episodic challenges inconsequential or the vigilant de-
fense of those norms unnecessary to their preservation.”194 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is inevitable that at times a state’s highest court will clash with the 
state legislature.  The two institutions clearly have different institutional 
cultures, institutional perspectives, and institutional wills.  The decision by 
state supreme courts to assert their institutional wills appears to be a strate-
gic one, based in part on the political environment and other contextual 
variables.195  In some states these institutional clashes will be more com-
mon than in others, and during some periods of time these conflicts will be 
more intense.  But neither the courts nor legislatures operate in a vacuum.  
These institutions must interact in a variety of ways over a variety of is-
sues.  Therefore, both courts and legislatures must attempt to understand 
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better the institutional perspectives of the other organization.196  In short, 
both institutions need greater communication with and greater respect for 
the other body.  In reality, in the United States our system of government 
requires us to abandon an archaic concept of separation of powers in favor 
of a notion of governance as dialogue among institutions with potentially 
conflictual institutional wills.  This case study of the interactions between 
the courts and legislature in Massachusetts nicely illustrates the point that 
studying the interactions between and among institutions can help us un-
derstand the decision-making process better than examining either institu-
tion in isolation. 
  
 196. The Courts, the Legislature, and the Executive – Separate and Equal? Issues at the State Level, 
87 Judicature 230 (2004). 
